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DDCI Speech

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MODERATOR: On behalf of the officers and members of the IAI, I'd like to welcome you to this first in the 1974-75 lecture series. And before I forget, I should mention that one of the traditional rules of the IAI, for today's speaker as well as subsequent speakers, is non-attribution. Everything's off the record.

When the newly elected officers of the IAI met for the first time a few weeks ago to come up with our slate of speakers for this year, we resolved that we would do our very best to ensure that the first speaker in particular was the best, and so we were delighted when Lt. General Vernon Walters accepted our invitation to meet with us today. I think some of you know General Walters personally. I think probably everyone knows him through achievement and reputation.

It's virtually impossible to identify General Walters with any particular professional label. He is a man of many parts. I think he personally would prefer to be thought of primarily as an Army man, a military officer. And he has had a distinguished military career. It began in May of 1941 when

Private Walters enlisted in the Army Field Artillery. About a year later 2nd Lt. Walters, U.S. Army Infantry, was a leader of a reconnaissance and intelligence platoon. In November of '42 he participated in the assault landing in Morocco, for which he was awarded the Legion of Merit. From there it was Algeria, Tunisia and, eventually, Italy, where first he served as aide to General Mark Clark and later on as the combat liaison officer to the First Brazilian Infantry Division, and so on, through to the present, a truly distinguished military career, including service in Vietnam in 1967.

In addition to being a military officer, he is an Attaché. As a matter of fact, in the view of many he is "Mr. Attaché." He has served in posts around the world. He has been Army Attaché in Rio de Janeiro and Rome. He was Attaché at large under Ambassador Harriman, with duty station in Paris, and, eventually, Defense Attaché in France, a post he held until May of 1972.

He is a linguist -- and that's probably the understatement of the century -- expert linguist (standing all) at his truly remarkable feats and accomplishments in the linguistic field.

When I first laid eyes on him it was several years ago. He was standing on the podium on the White House lawn

flanked on the one side by the President of the United States and on the other side by the President of France, translating for both of them over international radio and television. He's done the same thing countless times whether the language was Portuguese, Italian, French, German, or what have you.

He is a diplomat. He has, among other things, served as assistant to the President of the Geneva Conference in 1953. He has been, variously, aide, staff assistant, special assistant, to people such as George C. Marshall, then Secretary of State; President Truman; President Eisenhower and President Nixon. He has accompanied Vice Presidents and Presidents on countless round-the-world historic missions, including for example the meeting between President Truman and General MacArthur on Wake Island.

It goes without saying that he is one of the foremost intelligence officers in the United States. His career in the intelligence field was capped in May of 1972 when he was sworn in as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the post he now holds.

He has (been) all these things, and more. And the reason he comes to meet with us today is the fact that he, for the last 25 years, has been an extraordinary statesman for the United States. People that we here know of as legendary names

he knows as intimate friends. World leaders over these past 25 years have come to seek his advice and counsel on countless occasions. And so we are proud to have him here today. And it is a great pleasure for me, and privilege, to introduce to you truly a man for all seasons, Lt. General (Dick) Walters. [Applause.]

DDCI: After an introduction like that, I don't know where I can go except down. Jerry was kind enough to say that I was a diplomat, but I have it on higher authority that I am not. [Laughter.] One day I was standing in a parade in Brazil alongside the Soviet Ambassador, and he spoke very good English. He had been in the States for six years. And he said to me: "The trouble with you Americans is you never bother to learn anybody else's language. Always you demand that people speak English to you." And I thought, he hasn't read my biography like I've read his. I said: "That isn't true any more. It may have been true 20 years ago, but it's not true any more." Then he said, "Oh, yes. And besides us people you do not have gift for languages like we (Slavs)." So I said to him -- I hope there are no Russian-speaking ladies in the audience. *Goordin Pashell. Eta Gorno e Lwin Znacite Eta* I said to him, *In Russian* [In French?] -- which I would loosely translate as garbage in English except that isn't the literal meaning of it in Russian. [Laughter.] "And I am astounded that an intelligent man like you, who's lived outside

the Soviet Union, continues to believe these fairly tales of Communist propaganda." So that shook him. [Laughter.] And I stepped in for the kill, and that's where disaster struck. I said to him in Russian, "Mr. Ambassador, would you like to try Portuguese?" knowing that I spoke it much better than he did. And he looked at me and he said, "Walters, you may be good soldier; diplomat you are not." [Laughter.] So I have it on, you know, fairly high authority.

I might add that one of the first things I did when I came into my present job was to ask, "Where is Andrey Andreyevich Fomin?" And they said he's Ambassador to Bangladesh. [Laughter.] And I said, "Well, he's not going up the ladder, that's one thing for sure." [Laughter.]

You have very good speakers out here all the time with whom I couldn't possibly compete. But I thought I would talk a little bit about people, people that the various oddities of my jobs have run me into from time to time, because I think sometimes we tend to get fascinated with the technological aspects of intelligence and forget a little bit the human aspects. And I think this is particularly true in dealing with foreigners. You know, Americans are very organized -- we have disclosure policies and policies for this and policies for that. Well, my experience is that relatively few other countries have policies --

if they like you, they'll tell you and if they don't, they won't. And the human aspect plays perhaps the more important part in the intelligence business with other people.

I know when I was Attache to France -- I'll tell you one amusing story (that) the Head of the French Intelligence, Military Intelligence Service, told me after he retired and he was asking me to help him get a job. I went to France in 1967 just about the time we got thrown out of the bases and so forth there, and he said to me -- This is, (well), many years afterwards. He said: "You know, when you came here, under those circumstances, with a long French background and knowledge of France and the French language, we were sure that the Americans had sent you here to stir up the Army for NATO and against De Gaulle." And he said: "The fact that you were a bachelor opened the possibility of two handles we might get on to you, so we watched you closely. And finally when neither of them worked out, we came to the conclusion that you were like the traditional Bishop -- never in your own diocese." [Laughter. Applause.]

It's not often that the Head of the other side tells you something like this. But one of the things the French said to me: You never ask awkward questions when you visit a military unit. Why not? Well, I said, I figure France is a sophisticated

country, and when I go somewhere, you send a note to the commander of the unit and tell him what he can tell me; and if he doesn't tell me, it's because he's not authorized to. And why should I ask a question that will embarrass the guy when he has to tell me he can't answer and embarrass me when he tells me he can't answer. I am more interested in projecting a favorable image of my country and the service I represent, because I have found that if you do this successfully you get a great deal. And in fact, when I arrived in France in 1967, it was a pretty hostile and a pretty cool environment. Before I left, I'd been into the French missile silos and into the submarine (~~camps~~)^{Pens}. I did^{nt} ask for that, however, but I had to connive.

The French Chairman was coming to the United States and they asked me what he wanted to see, and I already was thinking ahead. I said he undoubtedly wants to see Minuteman silos. And the Americans wrung their hands and said, "Oh, that's very difficult." And I said, "I know, but he wants to see them," and we showed him Minuteman silos. A couple of years later General Wheeler was coming to France and the French said to me, "What does General Wheeler want to see?" I said he wants to see silos. And they said, "Oh, that's very difficult." I said, "Oh no. General ^{urquet} Forkay ~~1962~~ saw our American silos." So we got into the French silos [Laughter] -- which shows that you need a little advance planning in some of these things.

Well, what I thought I would do is talk about the human dimension and some of the people (in) some of the ways they reacted to various things, obviously drawing on my own memory and experience with them for various things, and by watching these people you learn a lot about, you know, how to deal with people. I was very young at the time of some of these.

I remember I went to the Bermuda conference in 1953, and Sir Winston Churchill was there, and the French were asking for help in Vietnam. And at the meeting Churchill kind of put them down rather harshly and suddenly he realized what he was doing and he decided that he was going to pay a tribute to the Frenchman, who was ~~Beedo~~ ^{BIDAULT} [sp?], who had been the President of the National Council of Resistance inside German-occupied France during the war since the Prime Minister got sick. And he said - in ^(his) ~~(these)~~ marvelous Churchillian tones he said: "If I say what I say, it is because for 40 years I have stood alongside our French comrades as they sought to preserve themselves from the mortal peril that threatened them. But let us never forget that Mr. ~~Beedo~~ ^{BIDAULT} here sitting with us living during the whole long night of the occupation of those four dreadful years in mortal peril of his life for every hour (of) every minute (in) every day, and in so doing --" No. "And then when we reached Paris he was there waiting for us under the Arch of Triumph, and in so doing

he earned the undying gratitude of the entire free world." By this time there wasn't a dry eye in the conference hall.

[Laughter.] Churchill was sobbing, Eisenhower was sobbing, the Frenchman had his face buried in his hands, and I was so strangled with sobs I couldn't translate for a few minutes. And then Mr. Eden spoiled everything. He said, "George, after a bouquet like that you've got to do something" -- [Laughter] -- which really let it down.

But anyway, that Frenchman - Churchill had said no to him all morning but he didn't go away from that conference with the impression that he had been told no, or if he did, it was much more mitigated than if he'd been told nothing. Which leads me to another observation I make about these things, which is that anybody who says "flattery will get you nowhere" has never had any. [Laughter.] Throughout a long career I have seen it used with extreme skill. I would say the greatest form of flattery I know is to quote a man to himself.

Recently I went to Portugal to see General Spino^{la}. And I went on the night train -- not secretly, but it was a little more discrete than coming in at the main Lisbon airport -- and I spent all night reading "Portugal ^{And} ~~(in)~~ the Future" by General Spino^{la}. I got out of the train at 10 o'clock and at 11 o'clock I was in Spino^{la}'s office and at regular 10-minute intervals I

would drop a quote from "Portugal in the Future." We had a great time. [Laughter.]

I must say that while I was talking to him I was bothered by one thing. I had heard a Brazilian story -- and the Brazilian stories are always a little bit hostile to the Portuguese in their way but you can't join in, but they always sort of portray the Portuguese as hayseeds -- and while I was talking to Spínola I kept looking at the monocle and remembering what the Brazilian said, that the monocle was the Portuguese version of the contact lens. [Laughter.] But I must say, he was rather impressive and he wasn't at all the sort of dramatic type that you might expect from that.

During the war I remember that Mr. Churchill came to see the Brazilian division I was with, and they had not yet fired a shot. Oh, Mr. Churchill got up there, Sir Winston got up there, and he said to them, "Brazilian and American comrades in arms." Well, once he'd said that, it didn't matter what else he said. The fact that they had been called "comrades in arms" by Churchill before they fired a shot was all that was required to put them in a very happy frame of mind. And he was a most extraordinary man.

Once I was talking to a Frenchman, and he came up, and I withdrew discretely because I thought he could speak French

(he)
(and) would talk to him, and I stepped off at some distance. And finally he said a few words and then he beckoned me back and he said: "Until I was 70 I could speak French; now it is more difficult. Come back here." [Laughter.]

One of the other people with whom these things (were) very important was De Gaulle. I first met General De Gaulle in 1942 when I took him a message from North Africa. I saw him on and off at various times during the war. Once I was in (Fifth) Army, and he came, and they'd told me to be sure and be there because he didn't speak English. And when I protested that he must have because he had been living in London for four years, they showed me a newspaper article that said he didn't. And in those days I was young and naive and I generally believed what I read in the newspapers. [Laughter.] So I went up into the van with General Clark with him, and they were discussing the withdrawal of the four French divisions in Italy to go into the south of France. And it was soon pretty clear to me that he didn't speak English, because General Clark would say no, and General De Gaulle would say ^{Qu'est-ce qu'il a dit?} [In French], and I would say ^{IL A DIT NON} [In French?]. [Laughter.]

So I was a little emboldened by this and I began to add some comments in English, such as: General De Gaulle says "yes," but I don't think he really wants to do it; or, he says "no," but I

think if you push him a little harder he'll give. [Laughter.] And at the end of the meeting he stood up and he turned to General Clark and he said, "General Clark, we have had a very interesting conversation." [Laughter.] "I am sure the next time we meet it will be on the liberated soil of France." When I stepped aside to let him out of the van -- and it's a metal wall in the van, but I'm sure the print of my body, which was much thinner in those days, is still imprinted on the van -- he tapped me on the shoulder and he said, "Walters, you did a very good job." That was the last time I have ever dabbled with anything I was translating. [Laughter.]

When I went back to Paris in 1967, I saw him at a lunch and he said, "Oh, I see you're back in Paris." "Yes." He said, "How long?" And I almost said, "Well, it was on that biographical slip, the (DST), put on your desk earlier before lunch." But I thought it was better not to, so I told him. And he said: "Let me see. The last time I saw you was in Italy in General Clark's van in a village named, ah, ah -- well, I can't remember, but it was in General Clark's van, wasn't it?" And I said, "Yes, General, it was." And I could see for a minute he thought, and he said, "The village's name was ^{ROCCA STRADA} ~~(Rock uh strata)~~, wasn't it?" And that was ¹⁷ years later. He named the village, and I don't think that any of the French Services could have given him that particular fact.

But he was an interesting man to talk to, and I participated in a number of interesting conversations between him and General Eisenhower. One night at (Rambouillet) Castle they both put on their bathrobes and sat in front of the fire and talked about - ^{the past} "what about during the war; why didn't you tell me; "did you know; yes, I did, but Roosevelt wouldn't let me, and so forth and so on. And (he) got on to French atomic policy, and I think this is something that has been greatly reflected in whatever the French have been doing since then. General Eisenhower was assuring him that he didn't need nuclear weapons, that the American umbrella would take care of everybody, and he said, "Yes, it will now --" We're in 1960. He said: "It will now because you still have what essentially amounts to a monopoly. But as the Soviets develop the ability to strike the cities of North America, you're not going to war - one of your successors is not going to war, nuclear war, for anything short of a strike against North America. And when that happens and the Russians attack with 200 divisions in Europe, I need the means of turning what your successor may want to be a conventional war into a nuclear war." He said: "Understand me clearly. I don't intend to compete with SAC or the long-range (air army) I simply want to have the means of forcing them to do something they don't want to do. And you must understand that the addition

of new centers of decision for the use of nuclear weapons will multiply the problem (and) the uncertainty of the Soviet planner." He said: "You tell me I don't need these things, but if you don't have them, you don't count in the world." And he said: "I cannot accept that it is dangerous for me to have something that a thousand Soviet corporals already know when you know I will fight with you in the crunch." He said, "Remember, I didn't do this. The socialists decided ^{to have Nuclear Weapons, then} ~~this~~" ~~And he~~ said -- and this is very interesting because he hadn't announced the withdrawal from Algeria yet -- he said: "I'm going to withdraw that French Army from Algeria as we've already withdrawn it from Indochina. And if I don't give those armed forces a sense of having a mission in the second half of the 20th century, I'm not going to have armed forces on my hands; I'm going to have 600,000 armed malcontents. French democracy won't last."

And he told General Eisenhower in September 1959, in my presence, that he would detonate his first nuclear weapon on the 13th of February 1960. And on the 13th of February 1960 he detonated his first nuclear weapon. He had said what kilotonnage it would be, and it was that kilotonnage. But in that conversation he had given away the intelligence, which with General Eisenhower's permission I passed on to a very restricted group of people in the U.S. intelligence community, ^{And} ~~But~~ he did

tell (him) the exact date on which he would set off (a) weapon. Now, obviously, weather helped him, and everything else, and everything worked out favorably. But he had set the 13th of February as the target date for it *and on that date he detonated it.*

Another interesting thing occurred at the conference of the U-2. I was there as the American-French translator. And we got there, and De Gaulle had seen Khrushchev, who had read a long statement in which he demanded that Eisenhower apologize. And De Gaulle said, "That's silly. He's not going to be able to do that." And Khrushchev said that "he must, he must, he must."

So the day of the conference came, and De Gaulle was running the conference in the (Elysée), and we went in to the conference room, and the Russians were all over in the corner and, unlike, *what usually happens* you know, at most of these things (when) everybody shakes hands *all around!* *The Russians* ~~and goes around~~ *they* stayed bunched up, and the British, French and Americans talked to one another and *then* we sat down. General De Gaulle opened the conference and he said that General Eisenhower is the only member who is here, besides myself, of course - De Gaulle - who is also a Chief of State, so I propose to let him talk first. And Khrushchev said, "No. I want to talk first." So after some shilly-shallying around, he let Khrushchev talk first. And Khrushchev stood up, and his hands were trembling, and he read the statement which he had read to De Gaulle the

previous day, and De Gaulle was obviously very bored with hearing it a second time ^{and showed it.} ~~and~~ as Khrushchev read ~~on~~.

I was told not to wear a uniform because this was a peace conference, but I was at the extreme right of the U.S. Delegation and immediately adjacent to me was Marshal of the Soviet Union, Rodion Malinovsky ^{Malinovsky} [69], wearing 54 medals, including the U.S. Legion of Merit. [Laughter.] I know because I counted them. ~~And~~ Khrushchev became more and more indignant about being overflowed, and finally he raised his voice, and De Gaulle interrupted and turned to the Russian interpreter and he said: "Will you please tell the Chairman that the acoustics in this room are excellent. Everyone can hear him clearly, and there is no need for him to raise his voice." Well, the Russian interpreter turned pale [Laughter] with this. And I saw De Gaulle watching his Russian interpreter ^{French -} ~~who was~~ checking the translation of the ^{Khrushchev's} ~~Russian~~ interpreter to see whether he was really translating it.

~~And~~ Khrushchev looked kind of nonplused ^{but} ~~and~~ he went on. And he said, "And I was overflowed." De Gaulle said, "So was I. Today." And Khrushchev said, "By your American allies?" De Gaulle said, "No! By you." Khrushchev said, "What do you mean?" And General De Gaulle said: "Well, that satellite you launched to impress all of us, the day before

you left Moscow, overflew France 18 times yesterday without my permission. How do I know that you did not have cameras in it?" Khrushchev raised his hands to heaven and he said - [In Russian] -- "God sees me. My hands are clean. You don't think I would do a thing like that." [Laughter.] And General De Gaulle said, "Well, what about those pictures of the far side of the moon that you showed us with such pride?" And Khrushchev said, "Oh. Well, in that one I had a camera." And De Gaulle said, "Oh, in that one you had a camera. Proceed." [Laughter.]

So he went on, raving to the end. And then he said that unless Eisenhower apologized he would not go on with the work of the conference. And I could see Eisenhower -- I've heard all about General Eisenhower's temper but, frankly, (in the) many years of working for him I never saw it burst out. But there was a red flush that came up from the neck and over the face, and when you saw that, you knew that the wisest thing was to break off whatever subject you were discussing. In fact, by looking in the morning I could tell, ^{when it was} you ~~know, this is~~ not the day to take up serious business on some particular subject.

~~Then~~ Khrushchev sat down. And De Gaulle said: "Well, when the U-2 was shot down I sent my Ambassador to Moscow to see you and ask you whether this conference should be held. And you said, yes, it should; it would be fruitful. And you knew then

everything you know now. You have now made demands that the President of the United States clearly can't accept, and that this conference, if you persist in this, is doomed to failure. And for this reason you have brought Mr. McMillian [sp?] here from London; you have brought General Eisenhower here from the United States; and, what is more, you have put me to grave personal inconvenience" -- [Laughter] -- which was clearly the more serious offense of the three. [Laughter.] He ^{then} said, "This is an affair of minor espionage ^{beneath the level of discussion between} ~~such as~~ Chiefs of State ~~shouldn't even be discussing.~~ ^{exclaimed}" And Khrushchev ~~said~~, "What devil has put the Americans up to this?" And De Gaulle said: "The same devils that have put you up to all sorts of other different things -- [Laughter] -- but this conference should be above devils." And he said, "I propose we meet tomorrow afternoon at" - whatever the time was. Khrushchev said, "I won't go!" and stomped out of the room. And General De Gaulle took General Eisenhower by the arm and me with the other arm, and he took us out on the stairway and he said: "I don't know what's going to happen or what Khrushchev is going to do. But whatever happens and whatever he does, I want you to know we are with you to the end." And Eisenhower was, obviously, very moved by this.

When I came back to France seven years later, after we'd been ordered out of these bases, I wondered what had led us

from that to the ordering out of the bases. And I had a lot of friends in old General De Gaulle's entourage -- I never talked to him really directly about this, except after he'd left (power). And I came to the following conclusion, and ~~that~~ -- This is my own personal conclusion, and I can't prove it by two and two or anything else. But it's my conclusion that at the time of the Cuban crisis when President Kennedy sent Dean Acheson and Sherman Kent over to see De Gaulle and tell him that we might have to do something to Cuba, De Gaulle, unlike most of the other people, said, "Well, if you feel it's necessary, go right ahead." When we didn't, he said to his ^{advisers} ~~people~~: "If they're not going to fight for Cuba 95 miles away, why should we believe they'll fight for Europe 3500 miles away? ^{therefore} ~~And~~ I must draw the consequences." ^{from this} ~~And if you were listening carefully at a great distance, you heard one of the consequences yesterday or the day before.~~ This is when he became convinced he'd have to have his own trigger. He did say, right up to the end, when I saw him privately, that - you know, he disapproved of many of the things that we were doing, but in case of a general war he would fight for the West, since he had no other possibility of a course. He did not really believe that he could remain neutral in such a circumstance.

He was a complex man. And as I say, he seriously meant at this conference that the really bad offense was not bringing Eisenhower from the United States but having him, General De Gaulle, set up this conference which wasn't going to work.

He once said to Mr. Murphy, Ambassador Murphy, that the trouble with Mr. Murphy was that he didn't understand France and the French. And Ambassador Murphy said that he'd lived in France and he thought he did understand France and the French since he'd lived there for 17 years. And De Gaulle said, "Seventeen years. I've lived here for 2000," and (you) really believed it. [Laughter.]

One of the other odd people I had to deal with at one time was Mr. Mossadegh, who was the Prime Minister of Iran. I went there with Mr. Harriman. He was sent by President Truman to try and mediate the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, and this was really a lesson in some of the things, you know, that were mind-boggling to an American, who thinks of policy as being something carefully worked out and everything else, because at one time Mossadegh was demanding more money per barrel than oil was selling for in the Persian Gulf. And Mr. Harriman in exasperation said, "Dr. Mossadegh, if we're going to talk about these things seriously, we must have agreement about certain fundamental principles." And Mossadegh said, "Such as what?" And Mr. Harriman said: "Such

as nothing can be larger than the sum of its parts. We can't give you more per barrel than oil is selling for, and they'll buy it in Kuwait or Saudi Arabia." Mossadegh said, "That's false." Mr. Harriman said, "False?" Did he say false?" I said, "Yes, he said false." [Laughter.] He said, "Explain yourself." "Well," said Mossadegh, "consider the fox. His tail is often much longer than he is." And that made a reasonable argument to him as to why you could get more than the sum of the thing. [Laughter.]

Another one, (when) Mr. Harriman would point out that something that he was doing would cause frightful trouble to Iran -- this was all done in French because he didn't want any Persian interpreters to know what he was offering -- ~~he said~~ -- All of these discussions were held in French. And one of his favorite phrases when you'd point something bad out to him, he'd say - ^{TANT PIS POUR NOUS} [In French] -- which I translated loosely as "To hell with us. Down the drain we go." And that seemed a perfectly acceptable option.

And then I got involved in translating for the British and him. And at one point the British negotiator was a rich - a millionaire laborite, Richard Stokes [and], and he was ^{Talking} discussing with Mossadegh -- and again this was going on in French and I was translating it -- and Mossadegh said: "The trouble with you is

that you're a Catholic; that's why we can't come to an agreement." And Stokes said, "What has that got to do with this?" And Mossadegh said: "Well, you see, in your religion you don't have any divorce, but in ours all you've got to do is say three times to your wife 'I divorce thee' and she's divorced. And you don't understand that we have divorced the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company." [Laughter.] And Stokes was equal to the occasion. He said, "Dr. Mossadegh, quite true. But remember, you still have to pay her alimony until she remarries." [Laughter.]

You know, these things sound crazy but they're the basis on which some of these decisions and some of these things are done, and it sounds absolutely outlandish and mind-boggling to us but a lot of these people reason *this way* - I mean, there is a sense of humor in all this and everything. But the point I'm trying to get is that all of their decisions are not made on the basis of cold, calm, quiet study of something; there is a much higher emotional content than is normally the case with us, and the atmospheric of these things *are very important*.

When Mossadegh came here -- Mossadegh was deaf in one ear and I had great trouble hearing him, and he'd always receive Mr. Harriman sitting in bed with a Mao-type camel hair tunic buttoned up to this. And when you went into the room he'd greet you with a flutter like this and you could tell what kind

of a day you were going to have. If you got a real cheery flutter, it was going to be all right. If you got sort of a languid one, you were in for trouble.

And Mossadegh had defeated Lenin. Lenin once said you've got to take a step backward in order to take two forward. But Mossadegh had perfected the art of taking a step forward in order to take two backwards. [Laughter.] You would negotiate all day with him to get him from B to C, and when you came in the next day, he wasn't at C, he wasn't even at B, he was back at A. And this was a very exasperating business.

I remember he came over here and I was assigned to him, and everybody went through a phase of "I can settle the Iranian oil problem" -- the State Department, the White House, the Defense Department -- everybody. And I was talking with Mossadegh with Ambassador McGhee [SPN], who was the head of Greek-Turkish-Iranian Affairs in the Department of State, in the Waldorf Astoria. But in order to maintain his thing of a simple underdeveloped country he had a camp bed moved into a luxury suite in the Waldorf Astoria so (he) could be photographed in this camp bed, showing that he was living a very proletarian existence in the rich, prosperous United States. So Mr. McGhee had to go back to Washington, and - I might as well tell you his name - Ambassador Ernie Gross [SPN], who was American Ambassador to the

United Nations, decided that he could solve the Iranian oil problem. So he came to me and he said, "Colonel Walters, I want you to make an appointment for Dr. Mossadegh this afternoon." Well, I knew that the State Department didn't want anybody else dabbling in, but he was an Ambassador and what could I do? So I made the appointment. And by this time Mossadegh was convinced he'd come (to) the United Nations, that the United Nations was a tool of British imperialism which was going to tell him to give back this oil, and he was very upset with the United Nations.

So I went in with Ambassador Gross, and we got a very, very poor flutter [Laughter] and he said, "Dr. Mossadegh, I'm your friend. I want to help you," and "I'm Ambassador Ernie Gross." And Mossadegh looked at him over this enormous nose that made Jimmy Durante's look like an amputee [Laughter] and he said, "Ambassador? What are you Ambassador to?" And Gross said, "Oh, I'm Ambassador to the United Nations." With that, Mossadegh let out a shriek as though he had been stabbed with a butcher knife and went into a convulsive fit of weeping, repeating over and over "The United Nations. Oh! my God, the United Nations." ~~Dr. Frankly~~, I'd seen a lot of quiet crocodile tears but I'd never seen this violent outburst before. So I said to Ambassador Gross, "I think we'd better leave." Well, he was horrified by what he'd ~~He told Dr. Mossadegh he would come back when Mossadegh felt better~~ set off, and we ~~(said "Mossadegh")~~ and went out the door. And

outside in the corridor he looked at me and he said, "Does he do this often?" [Laughter.] And I told him the truth. I said, "I've seen lots of quiet crocodile tears but I ~~haven't~~ ^{have never} seen a convulsive outburst like this." He said, "You haven't? Then you must never tell anybody he did it for me." [Laughter.]

I just want you to know what's behind some of these things. You know, they all look much more organized ^{and thought out} and ~~every-~~ thing than this. ^{they really are}

I went to see him -- ~~(I know)~~ ^{had been} the last day he was in Washington, I ~~went~~ ^{had been} to see him several times ^{previously} with people and it was clear we were not going to come to any solution. And finally on the last day he asked me to come up, and I thought, ~~My God~~ I can see the headlines now: Obscure Lt. Colonel Solves Iranian Oil Problem. [Laughter.] I too had gotten ^{caught up with the idea} ~~into this~~ ^{that I could talk sense into him}. [Laughter.] So I went up to Dr. Mossadegh's suite and we had Persian tea and (milled) around for a while, and he said, "Can I ask you something?" I said, "Sure." He said, "May I kiss you goodbye?" [Laughter.] So I thought about it for a minute and I said, "If it's only on the cheeks and nothing else is involved, go right ahead." [Laughter.] So I said to him, "Don't you realize you're going back to Iran after all these three months of expectations of hope with nothing to sell?" He looked at me and he said, "With the crazy fanatics I have in my country, don't

you realize how much safer I am going back with nothing to sell?" (Well) in the middle of all this there was foxy thinking going on. But as I say, you know, we tend to think of all these political decisions as being made somewhat the way we make them, but they are not. And when we read and we listen and we hear what people are saying and we have other technical indications, these are not always the only basis on which these things are operated.

Not long ago I went to see General Franco, about a month before he got sick, and he was very feeble and he was shaky from Parkinson's disease, but the questions he asked were very clear and very lucid ones and at (a) high level. And I said to the Prime Minister afterwards, "Does he keep abreast of everything?" He said, "No. He just wants to be the master in the big things." And he looked at me and he said, "And in the big things, he still is."

General Eisenhower once asked him what he thought of the Communist world, and ~~he~~ he gave a most dispassionate and detached account.

Another time I was sent to see him and talk to him about what would happen when he died. And if you can think of an awkward subject (of) discuss^{to}ing with anybody, it's their own death. And I must say, he discussed it as though he were talking about Marshal Tito or Mao Tse-tung and not himself. And he

said: "I have created a mechanism, I have appointed the successor, and I have appointed him without becoming a lame duck, and when the time arrives all of this will operate smoothly." It remains to be seen whether it will or not.

But I must say, he impressed me as being a most un -- You know, we expect Spaniards to be excitable and so forth, and he's the most calm, relaxed Celt, or Kelt, from the northwestern part of Spain. He did say that he expected to be around for a while. His father died at the age of 96, under rather compromising circumstances [Laughter], so he didn't have any immediate plans for leaving.

Not all of these things have gone off as well as I've been telling you. Sometimes I (have) frightful disasters. Shortly after I arrived in Paris as the Military Attaché in 1967, I got a call from an old British friend of mine who had been at SHAPE with me in the early '50s. And since he wore a monocle and a blackwatch kilt he was a little more conspicuous than most of the other British officers there. [Laughter.] So he called me up and he said, "What's happened to you, old boy?" So I told him about all my triumphs and campaigns and promotions, and I wound up by saying: "And I am now the new American Military Attaché to Paris. I am now a Brigadier General. But just between us, I'm on the list for Major General." And I said to him with some

condescension, "What's happened to you, old boy?" He said, "Old boy, I am the Governor General of New Zealand." [Laughter.] And as I paused for breath he said, "And I knighted my Prime Minister before I left." [Laughter.] I said, "Bernard, I will never play one-upmanship with you again. [Laughter.]

Not long ago I went to see Peron, and I saw him alone for an hour and 45 minutes. I'd known him many years before. And I'd talked to a lot of medical people about his conditions and I was told what to look for. And I saw none of the swollen ankles, and the dilated blood vessels, and the loss of thread of what he was talking about, and so forth and so on. And I came back and reported that, you know, he was (in) splendid (self) and would last for a long time. He died one month later. [Laughter.] So ^{their} ~~my~~ distant diagnosis ^{was} ~~is not~~ a good one.

But I had an interesting conversation ^{with him} since within CIA I had had a considerable discussion with some of our people who had drawn up an estimate in which they said they felt that Peron would be forced by circumstances to move very far left, to a position extremely hostile to us. And I said I didn't think this would be the case for a number of reasons. First of all, when he came back he chose to be inaugurated in uniform ^{his} (of) as a Lt. General, and that was an indication. Then, when they had the attack on that army post, he went on television to denounce it, ^{again}

in uniform. Then he fired the commander-in-chief of the army, who had given us a great deal of trouble at the conference of the American armies. And I felt that all of these meant that what they said was a distinct possibility but it wasn't - and they used the word "inevitable." So I disagreed with (it).

And when I was talking to Peron, he said: "I have never been a man to kill people, but now I must kill people. If I do not kill these terrorists, they will kill Argentina. I will exterminate them to the last man, since I have no choice. If I don't, they will kill Argentina." A month later he died, and ^{his wife} ~~she~~ succeeded him.

I must add that the great disappointment of this trip was that I did not get to see her. I saw a very large car outside (of a special body) and I said, "Is that his?" And they said, "No. That's hers." My own impression is that she'll be there for quite a while. She bears the magic name, she is the Constitutional President, there are no acceptable alternatives. And in a machismo country like Argentina the fact that she's a woman will convince all the power groups that she will be more easy to influence than any man would be in that job, and I think they're wrong -- she won't.

Peron was a very remarkable man. I was astounded at what apparent good health he was in when I saw him. He talked

for an hour and 45 minutes, he never got up and left the room, he never lost the thread of what he was saying, and he was very, very lucid. He was talking about the Cubans and he was wondering why we didn't be nicer to the Cubans. And he said: "Peron ^{CASTRO} [sic] is a barking dog. Why don't you throw him a bone?" And I said, "Well, he's the kind of a dog that bites the hands that throw him bones." He said, "No. You should try and separate him from the Russians." I said, "What makes you think that's easy?" He said: "Well, I recently saw the Cuban Ambassador to Argentina, and he's a great theoretician of the Cuban Communist Party and he (has) just come back from the Soviet Union. And I said to him, 'Did you see the Soviet leaders?' He said yes. And I, Peron, said to him, 'What did you think of them?'" And again I hope the ladies will excuse me. He answered in Spanish, [In Spanish] -- "They are the ^{SONS} ~~daughters~~ of the great ~~whore~~." And he said, "If the theoretician of the Communist Party feels this way about them, it shouldn't be that difficult to (~~pry and~~ ~~work~~) them away. *from the Soviets*

So I said: Well, I have some doubts. The last time Fidel came to the United States, in 1961, to go on a radio/television" -- and we still had diplomatic relations and things with him, not when he came to the United Nations and killed the chicken. (But) he came to go on "Meet the People" program. And the American

Government was a little bit confused as to what to do with him. Nobody had invited him. But he was the Prime Minister of Cuba, so they decided that he'd see Vice President Nixon and Secretary of State Herter. And they reached around for somebody speaking Spanish, and guess who it was, to escort him around for three days. And he went in to see Mr. Nixon and he said, "Why am I criticized for shooting war criminals?" Mr. Nixon said: "You know, any time you arrest anybody at eleven, try him at twelve and shoot him at one in the national stadium in front of the televisions cameras, you're likely to be criticized. [Laughter.] And Fidel said, "Yes, but public opinion approves of it." And Mr. Nixon said, "Well, German public opinion approved what Hitler was doing until quite late, but that still didn't make it right." And there we lost Fidel. To him the criterion was what public opinion approved, and this is what condition(s) his decisions rather than any abstract philosophy, even of Communism.

And I must say, he appeared to me to be under tremendous stress all the time. He twitched and moved constantly in his chair. And when he came back from the television program he said, "I made a bad impression." Well, he really had. He had not done well at all. Besides, maybe the best thing was not to say anything at all.

One of the other people that was of some interest was Pompidou, whom I had some dealings with. During the time that I was Military Attaché in Paris, quite early, in '69, I was used by Dr. Kissinger as an intermediary with the North Vietnamese in the secret negotiations which ultimately led to what passes for a cease-fire. But this was a very complicated thing. He said to me, "Can we do this without the French knowing?" And I said: "No. France is a sophisticated country. They watch the North Vietnamese, they watch us, they watch everybody. You can't do it. You've got to let them know." "Well," he said, "how can I do this, because if it becomes public they'll break off." I said: "The answer is, you go to Mr. Pompidou and you ask Mr. Pompidou to keep it in the upper levels (of) the French intelligence community so that it doesn't seep down, and only a few people know it." So we did, and this was effectively done.

~~THIS FACT IS~~
~~And this is all~~ out in a new book by Tad Szulc -- not
all of it, but the fact ^{itself} ~~of this~~ is out.

~~And~~ 15 times I brought him into various isolated air-
dromes in France and brought him into ^{PARIS to stay at} my apartment; he ^{would} spend the
night and the next day he'd go out and talk to them.

And it was a fascinating experience to watch these negotiations over a long period of time and to watch some of the

repartee. One day he came expecting to find Le Duc Tho [sp?], who's a member of Hanoi's Politburo, and he wasn't there and instead the North Vietnamese Ambassador ~~to Hanoi~~, Xuan ^{THUY} ~~THAI~~ [sp?], was there. ~~And~~ Dr. Kissinger came in, he looked around the room and he said, "Where is Le Duc Tho?" And he said, "He's not here." And Kissinger said: "I'm the Special Adviser to the President of the United States and a very busy man, and I've come 3500 miles to see you people and I expect some one of your Politburo here." Then Xuan ^{THUY} ~~THAI~~ said, "I am the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary." And Henry looked at him and he said, "So is Bill Porter." He turned around, walked out, went back to the airfield and went back to the United States. The next time we came Le Duc Tho was there.

One interesting episode -- and this I hope doesn't get out of this room -- that occurred during this was, one night I was told that Henry would be coming on U.S. Air Force 1, ostensibly on a training flight but something went wrong with the airplane, which, as we all know, never happens on airplanes of the U.S. Air Force, but on this occasional, rare case it did. So I began to get desperate calls in the afternoon telling me that I should do something. "Well," I said, "the airplane's in the air. I cannot alone cover all the airfields in Western Europe. When you tell me where he's going to land, I'll do something." So this led to further consultations. And finally they told me he was going to

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So, you know, I don't want you to think all these things are decided, you know, on a basis of supreme intellectual study of the national interest. [Laughter.] Other factors, other of these rather human and rather unpredictable factors govern a great many things. But I would like to tell you one last story and then I'll try to answer any questions (you) have. But I think

this story comes under the heading of "Don't underestimate the Local Service," and this is the fruit of two experiences of mine.

When I went to Italy as Military Attaché in 1960, I was briefed both in the Pentagon and at CIA, and everybody said: Well, the Italians have got a good little shop, but they don't have much money, you know, and it really isn't, you know, one of those tremendous things, and I mean they do what they can, but it's - all right. Fine.

So I arrived in Italy, and my first call was going to be on the Third Corps in Milan. So I made arrangements with the Chief of Service, General De Lorenzo [sp?], whom some of you may have known, who wore a monocle and looked more like the chief of spies than anybody Hollywood or James Bond ever cast in the role. And it was all set up, and I took off from Rome, driving my own car, and I spent the night at the U.S. base at Leghorn, and then -- That was before the autostrada was open. And the normal way to Milan would have been up the coast to Genoa and then up.

But I suddenly, the next morning, remembered a great restaurant in Florence that had the best green lasagne I could remember. Then I thought, (I may be) two hours late in Milan, but nothing^{is} scheduled. So I turned off and I went up to Florence. And usually, as an Attaché when I drove, I kept my eye on the rear

vision mirror to see whether I saw the same face behind the same or other wheels, or other wheels with different faces, and I didn't see anything. And I drove into Florence and I parked the car in the square in front of the station.

Now, Florence is a city of 750,000 people. It's a big city. And I walked two or three blocks to this restaurant, and I went in and I ordered the green lasagne. And while I was sitting there, a man walked up to me and said: "(Senor ~~Cornello~~ ^{Colonnello}), I am carabinieri warrant officer so-and-so, and there have been several changes in your program in Milan and the Chief of Service wanted to make sure you got them before you got to Milan." So I understood that what I was getting was a demonstration that he could find me in a city of 750,000 people with no difficulty.

And a couple of weeks later I saw him in Rome and I asked him whether he knew - in a different connection, whether he knew what the Bulgarians and the Poles and the Rumanians were doing, and he said, "Walters, do you remember the Othello [~~off~~] restaurant in Florence?" I said yes. He said, "Well, if we do that for our friends, try and imagine what we're doing for the others." [Laughter.]

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in Rome, I completed my business on Friday evening, I ^{was} ~~am~~ due in Paris Monday morning; I thought I'll hire a car, I'll drive to Florence, go look at my old World War II battlefields above Florence, take the night train from Florence, be in Paris Monday morning for my meeting. So, accompanied by three people, I drove to Florence. And we got checked in at the hotel and ~~we got~~ settled; then we went for a walk. And it was about one o'clock and I found myself in front of the station, and this brought back memory of great green lasagne and I said let's go to Othello for lunch. So we went to Othello's for lunch, and we had ~~lunch~~, The green lasagne was as good as ever but four times as expensive.

And at the end I called the waiter and I said, "May I have the bill?" And he said, "^{Signor} ~~Senor~~ Generale (I was in civilian clothes). He said, "(~~Senor~~ General), there is no bill." I said, "What do you mean there is no bill?" A young man at the next table stood up and he said: "(Senor General), I am Captain ^{Menichelli} ~~Menichelli~~ [sp?]. In order that you may know that in 12 years the Service has not lost its skill [Laughter] once again you are the guest of the Chief of Service." [Laughter. Applause.]

The great lesson of that -- and it was confirmed by a story I told earlier at lunch -- at the age of eight I was arrested in France for riding a bicycle without a license plate. Forty years later they reminded me of it. So the only point I'm trying

shows
to make by those two ^Ais, don't underestimate the local service.
[Laughter.] I think if one does not, one is less apt to fall
into either temptation or mistakes.

A lot of this has been personal reminiscence about people. But really one of the things that has impressed me is how relatively few people work out these things on the basis on which we work them out, and sometimes when we try to analyze what people are doing and we have hard material factor A,B,C and D, sometimes that human factor, E, may be not an additive but a multipl^{CV}~~icate~~ate that affects the whole equation, and that is one of the harder ones to predict. This is why I have always harped on the importance of biographical information, since it is really a tremendous adjunct to any other form of intelligence if you know how the man is going to react.

When I was an Attaché, biographical information was one of my prime concerns. As a matter of fact, when I came to CIA they put in front of me, as I went down to our Reference Section, a biography of a Brazilian General written in 1960 saying: This man will probably become the President of the Republic. And it was General Emilio Medici, and it was written by me. And I thought this was a pretty good selection, and I also thought it showed excellent judgment because I'd said this of at

least four other people and they did not put that in front of me. [Laughter.]

But these human factors are of tremendous importance. There isn't any hard, definite point I'm trying to make, except that there is a mixture of things that go to make up the way that people behave and of which we should never lose sight and think that we can calculate these things with simply mathematical precision. There is precision involved if you know enough about the man to know his reactions and how he may react under certain circumstances. That will help you to arrive at a more exact final calculation as to what he is going to do.

And finally, since I happen to be here and I happen to occupy the job I do now, I just want to tell you how much everybody in the Central Intelligence Agency appreciates the incredible job you are doing for the United States and the incredible input you put into arriving at the decisions that govern our policies into which many of us Americans don't like to believe there's a human input, but my experience has been there's more than we sometimes like to accept.

Now this has been a very confused, very disorderly, very unorganized presentation, very (nonconducive) to questions. But if you have any questions you'd like to ask me and if there is any time left -- I'm not sure where I am in relation to my

time. You can ask me about questions from anything from Watergate to the texture of the green lasagne. [Laughter.]

[Pause]

I guess they figure that I told them everything I knew. [Laughter.]

Yes?

Q: (I don't know if this will be of interest -- maybe it might). Back in (1965) we had an Iranian - the oil problem, suddenly became (Assistant Secretary or Deputy) He wasn't a diplomat, but within six weeks he had the problem solved. (Do you know how he did it?)

DDCI: Well, there had been a change in the government in Iran [Laughter] which was not unhelpful.

But you know the old story of the difference between diplomats and ladies, I'm sure, that when a lady says no, she means maybe; when she says maybe, she means yes; and if she says yes, she's no lady. [Laughter.] And when the diplomat says yes, he means maybe; and when he says maybe, he means maybe; and when he says no, he's no diplomat. [Laughter.]

A number of factors contributed. The Iranians had been trying to sell (this) oil, and, really, the cartel of the world oil companies was still working in those days and people just wouldn't pay them. I had a little experience of this.

Mossadegh went to the World Court at The Hague, and I was sent there to work on (it). And I checked in at the Hotel (De Zalm), which was a nice old hotel in The Hague, and I had no trouble getting a room. And I said, "What room is Dr. --" It was, at that time, the hotel in The Hague. And I said, "What room is Dr. Mossadegh in?" They said, "Dr. Mossadegh is not in this hotel; there's no room for him." I said: "There's no room for him? But I arrived a few minutes ago without any reservation; there was room for me." He said to me, "(Mineer), this hotel belongs to the Royal Dutch (Shell Company)." [Laughter] "There is no room for Dr. Mossadegh in this hotel." [Laughter.]

I think it was a combination of a change of government and the fact the Iranians could not sell the oil simply because none of the great oil producers would ^{buy} it. The Iranians had no tankers in which to move it, and none of the great oil companies would touch it and ^{had} more or less made a compact that, though they competed among themselves, they'd ^{did} ~~have to~~ hold ^{the} ~~this~~ line or something terrible ^{did not} ~~would~~ happen, ^{as it has} ~~like~~ has happened recently.

I don't know the details of how he solved it, but I think it was a combination of various things that enabled him to do so. Furthermore, Mr. Hoover is a very prestigious name, and foreigners are very sensitive to use of prestigious names. They'll do something for somebody well-known that they may not do for

somebody who is less well-known. There's less sense of surrendering, according to the importance of the man you're dealing with.

Q: [Inaudible.]

DDCI: Well, I think it's changing. My Director, Mr. Colby, speaks Italian, French and Swedish. So it isn't necessarily a hindrance in the organization (where) I work. The new Deputy Director for the intelligence community, Sam Wilson, Major ^{GENERAL} Sam Wilson, soon to be Lt. General Sam Wilson, is a fluent linguist.

One of the things that concerns me very much in our Organization, I'm sure must be a little bit of a problem here, is the whole question of language. Until now we've been able to rely on the children of the immigrants. But the children of the immigrants are now retiring, and the grandchildren of the immigrants don't speak the old language. And I see rather serious problems coming up on providing really good linguists -- because, you know, you're trying to, let me say for instance, listen to a conversation in which you are not participating; it's about twice as hard and requires twice as much knowledge of the language as talking directly to someone where you see the facial expression and the gestures and so forth that accompany (them). And this is going to be, I think --

You'll probably have ~~of~~ ^(no) little) difficulty in getting people to learn Chinese and Russian, because they're big world languages. But one of the problems I see down the line is getting people to learn languages that are spoken in relatively restricted areas. First of all, in our particular business the people will say: "Oh well, I'll always go to Cambodia, or anywhere else for that matter." And I think this is going to be quite a serious problem. And many people oppose proficiency pay for language, but I think we're going to have to come to it sooner or later if we're going to have the kind of qualified ^{linguists that} languages we need. This may be totally contrary to the policy of this Organization -- [Laughter] -- it may be totally contrary to the policy of CIA, but in my opinion that's where we're going to have to go eventually.

Now don't all line up to see General Allen as you leave. [Laughter.] I can't commit him.

But I think there ^{will be} less and less of this ^{kind of} difficulty and more and more recognition of this. I don't think language by itself is enough; you've got to have other things as well.

It's like the old story of the man who went to Bismarck and insisted that Bismarck see his young son. And Bismarck said: "Well, I'm a busy man. I'm the Chancellor of Germany. Why do I have to see your young son?" And he said, "He's going to have a fantastic future." Bismarck said, "What makes you so sure he's

going to have a fantastic future?" He said, "Well, he speaks seven languages." And Bismarck said: "That's great. He's going to make a wonderful concierge for some hotel or head waiter for some restaurant." [Laughter.]

So you've got to have more than that. The language knowledge is not enough. But on the other hand, I think people (don't sufficiently) understand that knowledge of (a) language is not enough. You must understand what you're talking about.

I was once asked to give a missile briefing for the United States, to translate it, and I said, "I can't do it." And they said, "Well, we thought you spoke French." I said: "I do, but I cannot translate what I don't understand. If you want me to do this you have to send me to guided missile school." STATINTL
It worked. [Laughter.]

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I think one of the great temptations that we all have to guard against is, we get fascinated with some particular facet of intelligence; no one facet will give you the real story -- you've got to have all of them, or as many as you can get. The more you get, the better relief, the better color, the better tone, you get. If you're operating on just one, you get one thing. But if you can complete it with other indications -- And I mean, I know that you people probably furnish an overwhelming percentage of the total amount of input that there is, but it's rounded out and put into (a sense) of perspective and depth by the other things. None of them can do the job by itself. And this building and the people in it are a monument to the American people's belief in the importance of what you're doing here.

Yes?

Stop me if I'm running out of my time.

Q: [Inaudible.]

DDCI: He never talks down to foreigners. I repeat, to foreigners. [Laughter. Applause.] He always uses self-deprecation, but would be outraged if they believed it. [Laughter.] And he is very, very smart and (add a fourth) very, very patient. He understand things.

The other day I went to a WSAG at the White House on the environment. (Dr.) Kissinger knew more about the paper under

discussion than the environmental specialists who were sitting there. How he retains this, I don't know. He obviously has superb retrieval of information, and the input has to be only slight but it's engraved.

I would say that he never talks down to foreigners, he deprecates himself constantly with foreigners -- none of them have shown any signs of believing him, fortunately (for) the negotiations -- and he's very smart and very patient. Those talks in Paris went on for three years. The talks with the Chinese went on for two.

But the human element. When I first contacted the Chinese in Paris, nobody - we had to talk (as Americans and) Chinese for years. They asked me questions like this: what does the State Governor do? can he belong to a party different from the President? So I finally gave them the World Almanac, and I'm sure they got 500 intelligence reports out of it. [Laughter.] Now, you know, maybe that was available somewhere in Peking, but it wasn't available in the embassy in Paris. And Dr. Kissinger was --

To give you an idea why I think he doesn't like them to take this deprecation seriously. When I would go there, the Chinese - I would be met at the outer gate by a junior official; he would walk me across the yard, the garden, to the main gate,

where I would - the door of the building, where I would be met by a higher ranking person. I would then be led into what I called the Fu Manchu Room, because it was hung with red velvet and it looked exactly like the scenario of a Fu Manchu meeting, and I would sit there and at 90 seconds exactly the Ambassador would appear in the door with a (ne how). And when I took Dr. Kissinger there the first time, the scenario was somewhat different. The two lower ranking people met us at the outside door of the garden, and when we got to the entrance to the building the Ambassador was waiting there. And after we left this place, Henry said to me, "When they receive you, is it exactly the same?" And I said no, and I described what happened. And I said, "And besides, I never get either music or incense." [Laughter.] And I could see the smile of relief that at least the Chinese had some respect for hierarchy even in the ^{agglutination} (Yalutarian) society. [Laughter.]

MODERATOR: (General Walters, the IAI) [Applause.]